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Abstract
Quantum mechanics, and classical mechanics, are framework theories
that incorporate many different concrete theories which in general can-
not be arranged in a neat hierarchy, but discussion of ‘the ontology of
quantum mechanics’ tends to proceed as if quantum mechanics were a
single concrete theory, specifically the physics of nonrelativistically mov-
ing point particles interacting by long-range forces. I survey the problems
this causes and make some suggestions for how a more physically realistic
perspective ought to influence the metaphysics of quantum mechanics.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a sharp increase in interest by metaphysicians in the
ontology of quantum mechanics, our current best theory of physics. But this
welcome development has an unwelcome feature: the bulk of this work has taken
a particular example of a quantum theory (the theory of finitely many nonrela-
tivistic particles interacting by long-distance forces), in a particular formulation
(the position representation) and treated it as if it were quantum mechanics in
general.1
This leads to problems: first, because it confuses quantum mechanics, which
is essentially a framework theory covering a huge number of particular theories,
with one particular theory falling under that framework, and thus falls victim
to a sort of category error; second, because the discussions of the ontology
of quantum theory mostly seem to aim at ‘fundamental’ ontology, while those
quantum theories which are more plausible candidates for ‘fundamental’ physics
(specifically, the quantum field theories underlying modern particle physics)
differ radically from nonrelativistic particle mechanics.
In this paper, I try to provide a more realistic picture of what quantum theory
looks like, in the hope of warding off these problems. I begin (sections 2–4) with
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1For examples, see Albert (1996), Esfeld, Deckert, and Oldofredi (2017), and most of the
papers in Ney and Albert (2013).
1
classical mechanics as a sort of warm-up case, proceed to quantum mechanics
(sections 5-6), and quantum field theory (section 7). I also briefly consider
modifications to quantum mechanics made to solve the quantum measurement
problem (section 8).
The physics I describe in this article is standard textbook material, and
I don’t attempt to give original references; readers can consult, e. g. , Arnol’d
(1989) or Goldstein, Safko, and Poole (2013) for classical mechanics, Cohen-
Tannoudji, Diu, and Laloe¨ (1977), Sakurai (1994), or Weinberg (2013) for quan-
tum mechanics, and Banks (2008), Duncan (2012), Peskin and Schroeder (1995),
or Zee (2003) for quantum field theory.
2 N-particle classical particle mechanics
One of the most important examples of classical mechanics is classical N-particle
mechanics.2 Mathematically, this theory describes the dynamics of N points in
three-dimensional space, represented at each time t by vectors x1(t), . . .xN (t),
and evolving under some differential equations
mk
d2
dt 2
xk(t) =
n=N∑
j=1,j 6=k
Fjk(xj(t)− xk(t)), (1)
where the mk are positive real numbers and the Fjk are vector functions. And
physically (at least at first sight) the ontology of the theory is tolerably clear:
the objects are point particles — particles of zero extension — interacting with
one another as they move through space deterministically; the mj are the parti-
cle masses; the Fjk are the forces between particles. There remain substantive
philosophical questions to ask: what is the nature of the force terms, and are
they simply codifications of particle movement or somehow responsible for them?
is the three-dimensional space of the theory representing an additional ontol-
ogy of substantival space or simply a codification of distance relations between
bodies? are the point particles, conversely, reducible to properties of the points
of space? — but nonetheless we seem to have a clear grasp on what the theory
is about.
N -particle mechanics does, however, have subtler mathematical representa-
tions that can also be useful, but which are further removed from this description
2In this paper I use “mechanics” (as in ‘classical mechanics’ or ‘quantum mechanics’) to
refer to the general framework of classical or quantum theories. This accords with current us-
age in theoretical physics (as seen in the titles of the references by Arnol’d, Cohen-Tannoudji
et al, Goldstein et al and Sakurai in the bibliography, each of which is concerned at least in
large part with the framework theory) but conflicts with an older usage (still often seen in
philosophy of physics) where the framework is called “classical/quantum theory” or “classi-
cal/quantum physics”, and “mechanics” is reserved for particle mechanics and to some degree
for other more-or-less “mechanical” systems, like rigid bodies, springs and perhaps fluids.
(The difficulty of saying exactly where “mechanics” leaves off is one reason I’ve adopted the
more modern convention.) Where I have in mind the mechanics of point particles, I say
“classical/quantum particle mechanics” explicitly.
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of the ontology. A collection of N points in 3-dimensional space is mathemat-
ically equivalent to a single point in 3N -dimensional configuration space: the
first three coordinates of that point represent the spatial coordinates of the
first particle, the fourth through sixth represent the coordinates of the second
particle, and so forth. (The use of ‘coordinate’ language here can be replaced
to some degree by a more coordinate-free geometric language, but it is impor-
tant to realise that this 3N -dimensional space must be taken as much more
highly structured than Euclidean space, precisely so that each point in it can
unambiguously code the separate features of each particle. )
The configuration-space way of thinking about classical particle mechanics
is an example of a state-space formulation in physics, whereby a large number
of properties of a complicated system are jointly represented by a single point
in a high-dimensional space. For another example, note that the equations of
motion (1) are second order, which means that to calculate the particles’ fu-
ture trajectory we need to know not only their instantaneous positions but also
their velocities. The state of the system is then generally said to be specified
by the 3N positions and the 3N velocities together, and so can be represented
by a single point in a 6N dimensional space called phase space. The first three
coordinates in this space represent the position of the first particle, the fourth
through sixth represent the velocity of that particle, the seventh through twelth
likewise represent the position and velocity of the second particle, and so forth.
(For technical reasons the coordinates are better taken as representing the mo-
mentum of each particle — that is, its mass times its velocity — rather than
the velocity, though the two are straightforwardly intertranslatable.)
Dynamics on configuration space, or on phase space, is known respectively
as ‘Lagrangian’ or ‘Hamiltonian’ classical mechanics. Each permits the equa-
tions of motion to be put in a certain, elegant abstract form: in the case of
Hamiltonian dynamics, for instance, we can define the Hamiltonian function
H(q1, . . . q3N , p1, . . . p3N ) of the 3N position coordinates q
i and the 3N momen-
tum coordinates pi, and write the equations of motion in the abstract form
dqi
dt
=
∂H
∂pi
;
dpi
dt
= −∂H
∂qi
. (2)
This is no more or less than a redescription of the equations (1), but it is
a useful redescription in many technical situations. It’s worth appreciating,
though, that the possibility of a state-space description says virtually nothing
about the theory’s metaphysics. The coding of the properties of a complex
composite entity (a collection of point particles standing in various distance
relations to one another) in a low-dimensional space, in the position of a simple
entity (a single point) in a very highly-structured high-dimensional space is just
a mathematical move, available for pretty much any theory. Supposing (absent
some further argument) that the mere existence of a state-space representation
of the theory tells us that the ontology of the theory is that of a point in a
high-dimensional space is thus fairly clearly unmotivated.
3
3 Other examples of classical mechanics
In much of modern metaphysics, ‘classical mechanics’ and ‘point-particle clas-
sical mechanics’ are treated as pretty much interchangeable. But in reality, the
latter is just one example of the former. Other examples include:
• A spring (abstracting away dissipative effects), where the dynamics de-
scribes how the end of the spring moves as it contracts and expands;
• A rigid body, such as a spinning top, moving freely or on a hard surface;
• Vibrations in a solid body such as a crystal;
• The flow of a fluid (again, abstracting away dissipative effects);
• The behaviour of classical fields, notably the electromagnetic field;
• The dynamics of space itself, which is the way general relativity represents
gravity.
What makes this plethora of theories ‘classical mechanical’? Here’s at least one
natural answer — all can be characterised by:
1. A state space which has the formal structure of phase space, representing
(in some abstract sense) the instantaneous configuration of the system and
its associated momentum, and with a common mathematical structure
(each phase space is a so-called ‘symplectic manifold’);
2. A dynamics given by a Hamiltonian function on phase space and a set of
equations of motion of form (2).3 (A more generous definition of ‘classical
mechanics’ would allow a broader class of dynamics and would include
systems with dissipation and friction.)
3. A composition rule for systems: the phase space of the combined system
A + B is the direct product of the phase spaces of A and B separately
(and the Hamiltonian of the combined system is the sum of the individual
Hamiltonians plus some interaction term). For instance, the phase space
of a two-spring system decomposes into the product of the state spaces of
two one-spring systems; given a partition of physical space into regions,
the phase space of a field is the direct product of the phase spaces for the
fields of each region. (The latter example can require a little mathematical
care to make precise but the details will not be salient here.)
So: what is the ontology of classical mechanics in general? I hope it’s
clear from the range of examples that this is a bad question, indeed a category
error. Radically different theories, with radically different ontologies, coexist in
the framework of classical mechanics. We can coherently ask what the general
ontological features of classical-mechanical theories, plural, are, but so far as I
can see that list is short:
3Albeit with some subtleties in the last two cases, due to various aspects of gauge invariance
(see, e. g. ,Matschull (1996).)
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Phase-space point representationalism: The distinct points in phase space
represent different physical possibilities (rather than, say, representing an
agent’s partial knowledge of a system).
Separability: Because of the direct-product rule for composing systems, the
properties of a composite system are exhausted by the properties of the
component systems.
Beyond that, while we can coherently ask questions about the ontology of a
particular classical-mechanical theory — and while, mathematically speaking,
any particular (non-trivial) classical-mechanical theory has a state space that is
richly structured, well beyond the basic structure required by classical mechanics
in the abstract — there is little or nothing to say about the ontology of classical
mechanics as a whole.
4 The failure of classical-mechanical fundamen-
talism
The would-be metaphysician of classical mechanics might respond thus:
What I care about is fundamental ontology. And most of these ex-
amples of classical-mechanical theories are clearly non-fundamental:
springs, fluids and the like are complicated composites. Set them
aside and look at the fundamental classical theory: presumably par-
ticle mechanics, or maybe field theory, or some combination of the
two. When I say ‘the ontology of classical mechanics’, I mean the
ontology of fundamental classical mechanics.
But this response assumes that we can identify some classical microphysics
such that all (or at least: a reasonable-sized chunk) of the rest of classical physics
can be seen as emergent from it. And there is no such classical microphysics.
To be sure, since Newton — indeed, since Democritus — natural philosophers
have hoped for an account of macroscopic matter (springs, fluids and the like)
in terms of the movements of point particles. But that hope has never been
fulfilled, and we now know it never will be, because quantum mechanics turns
out to play an indispensible role in our understanding of atomic and molecular
physics. Indeed, it was the realisation, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, of the widespread failure of classical microphysics to underpin bulk
matter — in the instability of the atom, or the anomalous heat capacity of
low-temperature bodies, or the paradoxical predictions of statistical mechanics
when applied to classical black-body radiation — that led to the development
of quantum mechanics in the first place.
This is not to say that classical models of microphysics are not often deployed
— but they are deployed in a piecemeal, opportunistic fashion that belies any
attempt to look for a unified classical micro-ontology. Mark Wilson (in his
extensive analysis of ths topic) puts it thus:
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[A] survey of successful exemplars of classical “molecular modeling”
shows that . . . sometimes the “molecules” selected can be modelled
as point masses, sometimes as rigid bodies and sometimes as some
simple flavor of flexible body (in other words, modeling practice
picks no favorite among the standard competitors for serving as the
“basic objects” of classical physics). Quite commonly, sundry gaps
arising within the classical narratives get patched over with straight-
forward appeals to quantum considerations, without any attempt to
construct a “classical story” for these splices . . . The net effect of
this bumpy support makes classical doctrine look like a suit of ar-
mor welded together from a diverse set of stiff plates. Considered
solely in its own terms, its organizational rationale will seem elusive,
but, regarded as outer fitting suitable for a quantum mechanical
knight, the entire affair makes complete strategic sense as an effi-
cient asymptotic covering. To dogmatically assume that this jumble
of hinged doctrine can be regularized into an axiomatised format
that employs only Newtonian terminology misdiagnoses the true na-
ture of its descriptive successes. . . [I]f we purify the contents of the
predicates that repose upon our facade into complete internal co-
herence, we will find ourselves sitting within the land of quantum
mechanics, and no longer in classical mechanics at all. (Wilson 2006,
pp.196-7)
Of course, nothing prevents the metaphysician from speculating about the meta-
physics of a possible world in which Newtonian particle mechanics is exactly cor-
rect; but then, nothing prevents them from speculating about the metaphysics
of a possible world in which springs or fluids are fundamental. What needs to be
recognised in any such speculation is that there is no reason whatever to think
that these possible worlds are phenomenologically remotely like ours. (And then
it becomes a somewhat pressing question what the point of such speculation is,
absent any reason to think that it gives a rough version, or first draft, of the
ontology of a world like ours.)
Furthermore, it’s worth recalling that Newtonian particle mechanics itself
has quite rarely been used to describe or model ‘fundamental’ point particles
(unsurprisingly, I suppose, since there are no such things). The original appli-
cations of the theory were to celestial mechanics, where the ‘points’ are entire
planets, or more precisely the centres of mass of those planets. Other applica-
tions are to the centres of masses of other rigid bodies, such as cannonballs or the
hard spheres used in models of dilute gases. As usual in physics (I’m tempted
to say: ‘as always in physics’), we are engaged in modelling the dynamics of
salient degrees of freedom of a system, rather than modelling the system in its
entirety.
This is not to say that there is no value in considering the ontology of a
given classical theory. It is to say that the value must consist in understanding
the emergent ontology applicable to systems described by that theory, in the
regimes where that description is valid. A detailed account of what it is to
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consider emergent ontology in this sense lies beyond the scope of this paper: I
sketch my own approach to the question in Wallace (2012, ch.2) (the concept of
‘scale-relative ontology’ introduced in Ladyman and Ross (2007) is also salient
here).
In sum, classical mechanics has these lessons for ontology:
1. Don’t blindly reify state spaces: phase-space-point representationalism,
the view that each point in state space represents a distinct physical possi-
bility, should be distinguished from phase-space-point realism, the radical
(and unmotivated) view that the world according to classical mechanics
is a single point in a high-dimensional space.
2. Remember that ontologically very heterogeneous theories fit under the
general dynamical framework of classical mechanics, and that only very
limited things can be said about the ontology of these theories in general.
3. Don’t automatically assume that these theories lie in a neat ontological
hierarchy.
4. Insofar as there is value in studying the ontology of a given classical theory,
recognise that this ontology is not a candidate for fundamental ontology.
We will see that to a large extent the same lessons apply in quantum me-
chanics.
5 Quantum theory in the abstract
In classical physics, normally the state-space formalism is derivative: we are
given the theory directly, in terms of (say) a collection of functions on spacetime,
or trajectories through spacetime, and the dynamics for that collection, and then
define the configuration-space or phase-space description of the theory in terms
of those more basic entities. Quantum theory, however, is conceived in sin: in
general the theory is given directly in a state-space formalism.4
That formalism, in the abstract (that is, at the level of abstraction analogous
to abstract Hamiltonian classical mechanics), consists of the following:
1. A state space (the space of density operators, i. e. positive trace-one self-
adjoint operators, on some Hilbert space);
2. A dynamics given by a Hamiltonian Ĥ (a self-adjoint operator on the
Hilbert space) and an equation of motion of the form
d
dt
ρ̂ =
i
h¯
[
Ĥ, ρ̂
]
. (3)
4This disanalogy is largely absent if we formulate quantum mechanics in path-integral
form, but in this paper I confine my attention to the more familiar Hilbert-space formalism.
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3. A composition rule for systems: given systems A and B, the state space
for the combined system A + B is the space of density operators on the
tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of A and B.
A particular subset of quantum states (so-called ‘pure states’) can also be rep-
resented by normalised vectors in the Hilbert space.
Any particular quantum theory will have much more structure than this
(normally given via some preferred algebra of observables); as in the classical
case, there is relatively little to say about the ontology of such theories in gen-
eral, without looking at these theory-specific details. Indeed, the list begins by
paralleling the classical one:
Quantum state representationalism: The distinct states in quantum state
space represent different physical possibilities.
Unlike in the classical case, this should not be taken as trivial. There
is a strong prima facie similarity between the formal structure of quan-
tum theory and that of classical probability theory : in particular, the lat-
ter also has a tensor-product composition rule, reflecting the possibility
of probabilistic correlation between systems. These similarities become
more marked when we consider that the empirical content of quantum
mechanics is contained entirely within the Born rule, whose predictions
are generically5 probabilistic, and are also reflected in various structural
similarities between classical probabilistic dynamics and quantum dynam-
ics (Bartlett, Rudolph, and Spekkens 2012), and so authors both old (Ein-
stein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935) and new (Spekkens 2007; Harrigan and
Spekkens 2010) have sought to interpret quantum mechanics this way.
(The contemporary term for such an approach is ψ-epistemic.)
However, quantum entanglement makes ψ-epistemic approaches to the
quantum state very difficult to sustain, as underlined by various formal
no-go results, notably Gleason’s theorem (Gleason 1957), the Kochen-
Specker theorem (Kochen and Specker 1967) and the more recent PBR the-
orem (Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph 2011). See Maroney (2012) and Leifer
(2014) for detailed reviews, but in short: it looks reasonably clear (without
being universally accepted) that any plausible non-representational read-
ing of the quantum state will have to presume instrumentalism (Fuchs and
Peres 2000) or some other radical departure from the usual scientific-realist
conception of physical theories as giving a third-party, agent-independent
account of the world (cf, e. g. , Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack (2014) or Healey
(2012); cf also my discussion in Wallace (2018c)).
Non-separability: In sharp contrast to the classical case, the state of a com-
posite system is not fully given by the states of the component systems:
in general, the quantum state of a composite is entangled, and cannot be
written as the product of the states of the components.
5That is: whenever the state is not an eigenstate of the observable being measured
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Physicists distinguish between ‘true’ entanglement (which could not even
be simulated by a local-hidden-variable model and classical probabilistic
correlations) and ‘mere correlation’ (which could be) but the distinction,
though of great significance to quantum information, does not seem to be
metaphysically salient.
To this could perhaps be added:
Superposition: The linear structure of Hilbert space, and derivatively of the
quantum state space, means that quantum theory always comes with a
well-defined way to add states of a system together to form other states of
the same system, and it is an important question what, in general, can be
said about the conceptual and metaphysical status of this superposition
principle.6
If there is more than this to say about the ontology of quantum theories in
general, it eludes this author.
6 The focus on nonrelativistic particle mechan-
ics
What are some concrete examples of quantum theories? They include:
• Systems of finitely many systems with two-dimensional Hilbert spaces. In
abstract quantum-information settings, these systems are called qubits;
more concretely, they can represent the spin degrees of freedom of spin-
half particles like electrons or protons.
• Harmonic oscillators or coupled collections of such.
• Systems of finitely many distinguishable, spinless, non-relativistic point
particles interacting under some multi-particle potential. (‘Nonrelativistic
quantum particle mechanics’.)
• Vibrations in solids, such as crystals (including in situations, like low-
temperature phenomenology, where classical models fail).
• Fluids (including systems like superfluids where classical models fail).
• Quantum fields.
The list is as heterogeneous as in the classical case, and indeed includes quan-
tum versions of most of the same systems. (The main exception is gravity, where
we have no fully satisfactory quantum theory as yet.) But the overwhelming
majority of recent work7 on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics is concerned
6Readers familiar with the mathematics of quantum theory will recognise that linear sums
of mixed states are not the same sort of thing as superpositions of pure states; further con-
sideration of these subtleties lies outside the scope of this paper.
7See, for instance, pretty much all the papers in Ney and Albert (2013).
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with a single example from this list: nonrelativistic quantum particle mechan-
ics (NRQPM), the quantum-mechanical version of the theory of non-relativistic
point particles discussed in section 2. Indeed, a student of the recent literature
could be forgiven for conflating quantum theory in general with this particular
example of quantum theory.
In fact, that recent literature is for the most part not concerned simply with
NRQPM in the abstract, but with a particular way of formulating NRQPM.
In that formulation, the Hilbert space for a one-particle system is identified
with a certain space of complex functions on three-dimensional Euclidean space,
so that a pure state of an N -particle system is a complex function on a 3N -
dimensional space. This starting point has led to a popular move in recent
discussions of quantum-mechanical metaphysics: wavefunction realism, where
the theory is interpreted as implying that physical space is high-dimensional
and that the physical world consists of a field on that very high-dimensional
space. (Wavefunction realism was introduced by Albert (1996) and is discussed
extensively in Ney and Albert (2013) and Ney (2018).)
Wavefunction realism can be usefully compared with a position that (so
far as I know) is never seriously advocated8: state-space point realism (in a
quantum or a classical guise), in which the state space of a theory is identified
with its physical space and the ontology of the theory is a single point in that
high-dimensional physical space. In classical state-space point realism, space is
3N -dimensional, with N the number of particles; in quantum state-space point
realism, space is typically infinite-dimensional.
The error in state-space point realism is hopefully clear: the position con-
flates representationalism, the view that distinct points in state space represent
distinct physical possibilities, with full-on literalism about the state, the view
that since a state is a single point, the physical universe consists of a single point-
like object. Representationalism is more or less built into classical mechanics,
and we have seen that there are powerful arguments for it in the quantum case.
But literalism is unmotivated: the whole point of a state-space description is
to represent all the physical complexities of a system in the geometry of the
space, so that a single point in that space can uniquely represent all the various
complex properties the system has. The very generality of the state-space move
(pretty much any dynamical theory can be given a state-space formalism) shows
the emptiness of trying to read ontology from it.
Wavefunction realism is not quite as manifestly absurd as state-space point
realism, but it shares some of the same flaws. In particular, it is an awkward
half-way house between something like a particle description of a theory (where
the state of the system is represented by a complicated object — a collection
of N points in certain spatial relations — in a relatively structureless space)
and a state-space description (where all the structure of the system is repre-
sented by its location in a very nonhomogeneous space, and the state itself
is structureless). In particular, while a wavefunction is a fairly highly struc-
8Albert (1996), in his discussion of the ‘marvellous point’, flirts with but does not commit
to the position.
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tured object, the space on which it lives is also highly structured: formally,
it is classical N -particle configuration space, which is much more structured
than 3N -dimensional Euclidean space. (It has to be, since any point in that
space uniquely picks out the spatial configuration of a collection of N points in
three-dimensional Euclidean space.) Indeed, the structure of the wavefunction
serves entirely to represent quantum-mechanical features of a system (the fact,
for instance, that it is in a superposition of two macroscopically different po-
sitions). Any quantum state intended to represent an approximately classical
state of affairs can be expected to have a pretty-much-structureless wavefunc-
tion, with all the structural information encoded by that wavefunction’s location
in configuration space.
So I think we have strong reasons to be sceptical of wavefunction realism,
or at least to recognise that it is not an automatic consequence of state repre-
sentationalism. At the very least, we should keep in mind that it follows from
applying a rather literal-minded approach to what is ultimately only one of
many possible formulations of NRQPM.
However, the flaws of wavefunction realism are not my main focus here. (For
more on them, see Wallace (2018a) or Wallace and Timpson (2010)). Instead,
I want to ask the parallel question as for classical mechanics: why focus on
NRQPM at all, when it is just one example of a quantum-mechanical theory?
I’m not aware of any real engagement with this question in the recent lit-
erature on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. (Indeed, very little of it so
much as mentions that there are other quantum theories.) But some natural
thoughts9 might include:
1. Because it’s simplest? But it isn’t. Finite-dimensional systems like the
spin degrees of freedom of electrons are much simpler.
2. Because it’s empirically adequate, at least outside the exotic regimes of
high-energy physics? The name ‘nonrelativistic quantum particle mechan-
ics’ might suggest this. But again, it isn’t. To be sure, it has a rather
wider scope than classical particle mechanics, and a few relatively simple
modifications — intrinsic spin, particle indistinguishability — widen that
scope further. But it’s still a theory that is deployed piecemeal, with the
forces between particles set on semi-phenomenological grounds, and with
electromagnetic effects handled semiclassically and in a rather ad hoc man-
ner. And many important phenomena — notably, those involving light
— cannot be handled at all within NRQPM. The two-slit experiment, or
the photoelectric effect — paradigm historical experiments on the road to
quantum theory — are outside the scope of NRQPM. So is the emission
of spectral lines by hot atoms. So is the laser.
9An anonymous referee makes another suggestion: that given that the ontology of particu-
lar classical theories is often relatively transparent, while the ontology of particular quantum
theories is invariably obscure, one virtue of studying a quantum theory of (say) particles is
to clarify the relation it holds to a classical theory of particles — and this can be pursued
whether or not we are treating the theory as fundamental. Extant metaphysics of quantum
theory mostly has not taken this route, but it seems worth exploring further.
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3. Because salient ontological lessons can be expected to carry over to other
quantum theories? The popular accounts of ‘particle physics’ might give
the impression that the point-particle paradigm will extend just fine be-
yond the restricted domains of NRQPM, so that if we understand the
ontology of a world in which NRQPM is exactly true, we’ll understand at
least the general features of the ontology of a world governed by our more
fundamental quantum theories. But as we will see, this too is radically
false.
7 Quantum field theory
I identified ‘quantum fields’ on my list of quantum theories, but in one respect
this is misleading. There are a great many quantum field theories, applicable
to a great many physical systems, and in fact it would be more accurate to
regard “quantum field theory” as a framework for theories: all quantum field
theories fall under the general description given by quantum theory, but they
share various structural features beyond those given simply by the axioms of
quantum mechanics.
Why pay attention to this particular class of quantum theories? Because
pretty much all of modern quantum theory either is quantum field theory, or
can be understood as derived from quantum field theory:
• Quantum field theory, not N -particle mechanics, is the general framework
in which high-energy ‘particle’ physics is expressed;
• It is also the standard framework for modern condensed matter physics;
• Anything involving interactions with light requires quantum field theory;
• Nonrelativistic particle mechanics is now understood as a certain emergent
theory underwritten by the quantum field theories of relativistic ‘particle’
physics.
So insofar as ‘metaphysics of quantum mechanics’ ought to be focussed on a
particular quantum theory (or class of theories), quantum field theory, rather
than NRQPM, looks like the right theory to study. Furthermore, quantum field
theory (or, more precisely, one particular quantum field theory, the Standard
Model of Particle Physics plus perturbative spin-2 gravity), unlike any previous
theory in physics, appears to be basically empirically adequate for pretty much
all phenomenology outside some very extreme (mostly cosmological) regimes.
Much of the metaphysics of science discusses ‘physics’ as if it is a unified whole
that can model all physical phenomena (or at least, say, all physical phenomena
on the surface of the Earth) in one go, in one model. But classical particle
mechanics never had a hope of doing that. Nor did quantum particle mechanics.
The standard model is the first, and so far the only, physical theory that gets
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anywhere near doing it.10
So much for the advert; what are the distinctive features of quantum field
theory from a metaphysical point of view? The details of the theory are well
beyond the scope of this article, but in outline: unlike NRQPM, in quantum
field theory
• There is an intimate, fundamentally-specified link between spacetime and
the dynamical variables;
• There is a very indirect, emergent, dynamically driven relation between
the microphysically fundamental variables and the phenomenologically ac-
cessible variables;
• In particular, ‘particles’ are just excitations of the quantum field (and
the particular excitations we get are regime-dependent: a more accurate
gloss of the popular-science idea that protons are ‘composed’ of quarks is
that ‘quarks’ are the appropriate excitations in a high-energy regime but
‘protons’ and ‘neutrons’ are the appropriate excitations in a lower-energy
regime);
• The process of ‘renormalisation’ scrambles up the degrees of freedom, so
that particle states (and other phenomenologically relevant states, like
the coherent states that describe quasi-classical states of the electromag-
netic field) are very complicated, highly-entangled states when described
in terms of the fundamental (i. e. , bare, unrenormalised) degrees of free-
dom;
• The whole point of renormalisation theory is that the form of the mi-
crophysical degrees of freedom is largely (albeit not completely) underde-
termined by the phenomenology, so that the phenomenological success of
quantum field theory gives very little information about what the world
is ‘fundamentally’ like.
So quantum field theory leaves the would-be student of ‘fundamental’ ontol-
ogy with a paradox. On the one hand, it’s comfortably the most fundamental
physical theory we have; on the other hand, its own central features inform us
that it does not give reliable information about the fundamental level.11 We
have good reason to believe that some still-more-fundamental theory replaces
the Standard Model beyond the energy levels at which it breaks down, but at
present we have only the most tentative idea of what that theory is like.
10This is not to say that the standard model in any way rules out more disunified approaches
to physics, like Nancy Cartwright’s (1983, 1999) — only that prior to the standard model,
there was no single physical theory that was even a plausible candidate for unifying the physics
of the observed world.
11I should acknowledge that this position on quantum field theory, though standard in
theoretical physics, is contested in philosophy of physics; see Wallace (2011, 2018b) and, for
the opposing view, Fraser (2009, 2011).
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8 Modifications of quantum mechanics
All of my discussion of quantum theory so far has concerned varieties of ortho-
dox, textbook quantum mechanics. But quantum mechanics faces the measure-
ment problem, and in philosophy (though not in physics) it is widely thought
that orthodox quantum mechanics must be modified and/or supplemented to
solve the measurement problem. And so, much of the metaphysics of quantum
mechanics is the metaphysics of these modifications/supplementations — no-
tably, the metaphysics of the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory (aka Bohmian
mechanics) (Bohm 1952) and of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) dynamical-
collapse theory (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber 1986).
A distinctive feature of these modifications is that they are defined not for
quantum theory in the abstract, but for specific instances of quantum theory
— nearly always for NRQPM. My discussion so far would suggest that it would
make more sense to study appropriate modications of quantum field theories, in
particular the Standard Model, but at present there is no fully satisfactory ex-
tension of either hidden-variable theories like Bohmian mechanics, or dynamical
collapse theories like GRW, to the Standard Model, or indeed very far beyond
NRQPM.12
In my view, the absence of such extensions, and the resultant failure of modi-
ficatory accounts of quantum theory to satisfactorily account for a huge fraction
of observed quantum phenomena, is itself a case for rejecting these accounts,
and looking for a realist understanding of unmodified quantum mechanics —
a search which (I argue in Wallace 2012) leads to Everett’s ‘many-worlds’ in-
terpretation. But put that aside: the metaphysician who rejects Everett has a
potential fourth rationale to study NRQPM.
But this rationale is ultimately no more defensible than those I considered in
section 6. GRW and Bohmian mechanics may be the best we’ve done so far in
pursuing modifications to quantum theory to solve the measurement problem,
but they are not true, nor is there any very good reason to expect their central
features to be preserved by future modifications of more empirically adequate
theories like the Standard Model. Indeed, the radical changes in the structure of
the quantum theories that are to be modified gives strong prima facie grounds to
suspect that those features will not be preserved. In particular, both GRW and
Bohmian mechanics give a special role to the particle position observable, which
has no correlate in the fundamental dynamical variables of quantum field theory;
more generally, the gulf that renormalisation opens up between fundamental
and phenomenological dynamical variables makes it difficult at best to guess
the structure of a hypothetical empirically-adequate modification to quantum
theory.
That is not to say that these theories are not of philosophical (or indeed
metaphysical) interest tout court. They are rightly celebrated as proofs of prin-
12There are a variety of proposals both for relativistic hidden-variable theories (Colin 2003;
Du¨rr et al 2005; Colin and Struyve 2007) and for relativistic collapse theories (Tumulka 2006;
Bedingham 2010) but to my knowledge no full working through of any such theories to cover
realistic interacting, renormalised theories.
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ciple: demonstrations that it is possible to solve the measurement problem by
modifying dynamics or adding ontology, possible route markers on the path to
new physics that would solve the measurement problem in deeper-level physical
theories, and thought-experiment laboratories to consider the general concep-
tual, epistemic and metaphysical implications of theories of this kind.
But the metaphysician who wishes to go beyond that sort of tentative explo-
ration and actually treat the ontological specifics of either theory as a candidate
for fundamental metaphysics — who wishes, for instance, to speculate about a
world consisting only of point particles on the basis that Bohmian mechanics
seems to describe such a world — owes us, at the very least, a proper story as to
why their approach should be expected to tell us anything much about the real
world. Absent such a story — and I do not really see how to tell it — the right
course of action for a metaphysician who believes we need to modify quantum
mechanics and who wants to say specific things about fundamental metaphysics
would seem to be silence, until such time as physically realistic modifications
are actually available.
9 Conclusions
The main point of this paper is just to give a realistic account of the complexity
and variety of quantum (and to a lesser extent, classical) physical theories, as
an antidote to overly simplified, unified and reductive accounts that seem to
be predominant in the contemporary metaphysics of physics. However, some
general conclusions can be drawn:
1. State spaces, ubiquitous in physics, should not be (blindly) reified.
2. Only very general, abstract conclusions about the ontology of quantum
(or classical) mechanics as a whole are likely to be possible.
3. There is no ‘fundamental’ classical mechanics: no single classical-mechanical
theory from which all other empirically-relevant classical theories can be
derived.
4. There might be a ‘fundamental’ quantum mechanics in this sense, but if
so, it is not nonrelativistic particle mechanics; rather, it is a quantum field
theory, the standard model of particle physics.
5. In principle, metaphysicians of quantum theory ought then to be looking
at quantum field theory — but they should do so with a clear appreciation
that the theory (at least as understood by working physicists) is, by design,
largely silent about ‘fundamental’ ontology. If there is a physical theory
which does tell us about fundamental ontology, we don’t as yet have it.
6. Metaphysicians interested in the ontology of various modifications or sup-
plements to nonrelativistic quantum particle mechanics need to have a
methodological story to tell as to what they are doing and why it is worth-
while.
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